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for self-defense, were primarily tasked with defending Japanese territory during the Cold War. Even after the Cold War ended, this role did not greatly change. Underlying this situation is Japan's alliance with the US, which originated from the US-Japan Security Treaty. While the SDF are charged only with the defense of Japanese territory, the US military stationed in Japan has deterred invasion from other countries. As a result, Japan has reached the present without the threat of military aggression from other states.
Furthermore, the US (or more accurately, a contracting party of the US-Japan Security Treaty) is obligated to jointly deal with armed attacks on Japanese territory, while Japan is not obligated to protect any territories, warships, aircraft, or other properties under US administration. Therefore, although the US-Japan relationship can be considered an alliance, it has been a one-sided alliance. Even during the Cold War, Japan did not participate in wars involving the US (the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and others).
Instead, it continued to devote itself only to defending its own territory, in accordance with its discrete right of individual self-defense.
At the end of the Cold War, especially with the start of the Gulf War (the First Iraq War), Japan was compelled to reconsider its military strategy, which had developed in this unique national security environment. The Gulf War provided a major opportunity to realize international peace and security through a UN-centric approach, an aim thus far touted by Japan. Although UN Security Council Resolution 678 "authorize[d] Member
States... to use all necessary means," Japan could not assign missions to the SDF beyond the defense of Japanese territory due its discrete right of self-defense as decreed by the Constitution. Therefore, throughout the Gulf War, Japan was limited to providing financial support to the coalition forces. After the war, in accordance with the underwater mine removal provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Japan dispatched the SDF overseas as minesweepers for humanitarian reasons. The inability of Japan to contribute to international efforts outside of this extremely limited capacity triggered discussion about the county's role in the international community. Moreover, in 1991 the Japanese government was stunned when Japan was not included in the 30 countries listed in the two Washington Post advertisements Kuwait took out to thank the coalition.
Establishing the International Peace Cooperation Law
It was in this context that Japan created the International Peace Cooperation Law. During the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis in October 1990, then Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu submitted the United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to the Diet. This bill would have created a UN Peace Cooperation Committee under the office of the prime minister, thus allowing Japan to dispatch UN Peace Cooperation Forces, which would be organized outside SDF force structure, to aid in transporting materials, providing medical care, and other peacekeeping tasks. During the Diet's debate on the UN Peace Cooperation Bill, a written response to the October 1990 memorandum stated that supporting actions, even UN actions, using military force were unconstitutional. Additionally, strong opposition from the mass media and public opinion led to the rejection of the bill in November 1990, one month after it was put forward. 1 However, during the process of attempting to pass this bill, a new idea emerged to permanently modify the structure of the SDF so that Japan could contribute to international causes, rather than dispatching the SDF just for the one-time response to the conflict such as Gulf War. Within this idea was also the proviso that if a strong public and political backlash to sending the SDF overseas was encountered, then the UN Peace Cooperation Forces, half-public, half-private organization, separate from the SDF, could be created to provide a structure through which Japan could contribute to UN peacekeeping and other actions. 2 The Gulf War, which began in January 1991, was short, with combat lasting for 100 hours from the initial ground fighting until the mission was completed. CNN broadcast live coverage from the conflict areas, which included video of Patriot missiles intercepting Iraqi Scud missiles. These factors gave the Japanese people the impression that this war differed from traditional warfare and showed the overwhelming power of a coalition force led by the United States. The fact that the aforementioned advertisement showing gratitude in the Washington Post did not include Japan also certainly shifted the national mood in Japan. In the end, the nation's understanding of the SDF and the concept of warfare in the modern era underwent significant changes, and discussions about how Japan could contribute to international causes became possible (although opinions for and against Japan's contribution were largely divided).
With these changes in public opinion and the mass media discourse, the Japanese 
The Five Principles on PKO Participation
What is generally referred to as the Five Principles on PKO Participation is explicitly called "the five basic principles governing Japan's participation" within the PKO Cooperation Act, and comprises the following five conditions:
1. A ceasefire must be in place between the parties in the conflict;
2. The parties to the conflict, including countries in the region in which the UN peacekeeping forces will operate, must have given their consent to Japan's participation in the operation and the peacekeeping forces;
3. The activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner, with UN peacekeeping forces not showing a bias toward any specific party to the conflict; This new approach with UNTAC saw Yasushi Akashi, the first Japanese UN staff who also worked as the Under-Secretary-General of Disarmament Affairs, appointed to lead UNTAC as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This became the first case in which the SDF was dispatched in accordance with the PKO Cooperation Act.
UNTAC had a ceasefire agreement in the form of the Paris Peace Accords, and apart from some members of Pol Pot's faction (the Khmer Rouge), the concerned parties accepted temporary governance by the UN. UNTAC maintained neutrality in the execution of its tasks, including its monitoring of the elections, so all five principles governing PKO participation were met. Not only did Japan make a significant contribution to the effort, with upwards of 600 SDF personnel deployed as ceasefire monitoring and construction units, but the country also sent 75 individuals to the civilian police division and another 23 individuals to the election monitoring division. Tragic sacrifices were made in the service of UNTAC, namely the murders of Haruyuki Takata, who was assigned to the civilian police, and UN volunteer Atsuhito Nakata, who joined the election monitoring group. Fortunately, no SDF personnel were killed. Thanks to the significant contributions made to recovery in post-civil-war Cambodia, Japan gained greater self-confidence in its participation in UN PKOs, sweeping away the trauma endured since the Gulf War.
Although the UNTAC PKO was a completely new type of PKO that involved temporary governance, its success was attributable above all to the ceasefire agreement that was in place, in line with traditional PKOs, and the fact that it was mainly a civilian operation. This was in line with the model of providing logistical support, including civilian operation through an organization separate from the SDF, as conceived by the idea of the UN Peace Cooperation Forces outlined in the UN Peace Cooperation Bill.
Even though it involved dispatching the SDF, this mission realized the ideal structure of post-ceasefire nation building PKOs. Furthermore, although danger from the armed Pol
Pot faction was always present, and skirmishes did occur, the fact that the cease fire was generally observed is also significant. The Cambodian people had high hopes for building the nation after the ceasefire, and UNTAC set clear goals in response to these hopes.
Because of this, it was difficult for groups in Japan that opposed sending the SDF overseas to be highly critical of the mission.
By successfully sending the SDF to this PKO in Cambodia, contributions to international causes based on the PKO Cooperation Act gained wide-ranging acceptance in Japan, opening a window for the possibility of future participation in PKOs.
Restrictions in the Five Principles on PKO Participation
The window for Japanese contributions to international causes, which opened thanks to the country's participation in the Cambodia PKO, did not immediately close. This While UN PKOs were facing such major watershed moments, Japan did not change the Five Principles of PKO participation, as outlined alongside with the PKO Cooperation Act. Therefore, these international discussions did not cause significant issues in Japan because of its cautious approach towards participating in PKOs dispatched based on unstable ceasefire agreements. At the same time, the window opened by the Cambodian PKO was rapidly closing, and questions began to arise about the pros and cons of limiting Japan's contributions to international causes through the vehicle of traditional PKOs.
Participation in a New Era of PKOs
After the challenging PKO experiences in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the UN gradually returned to the traditional PKO format, pursuing election and ceasefire monitoring. At this time, the fervor that had risen immediately after the end of the Cold War for building a new international order that was centered on the UN had cooled considerably. Japan clearly found itself in a situation in which it was easier to participate in PKOs. Nonetheless, the enthusiasm for contributing to international causes directly Protect." 7 The report explicitly stated that countries have the unmistakable responsibility to protect all populations, and when a country does not fulfill this responsibility, the international community is tasked with it.
As the transition continued from PKOs that accompanied the use of force, such as those seen during the 1990s, to more realistic and responsible peace actions, Japan once again had an opportunity to hope for the type success that it experienced with the However, after the LDP returned to power in late 2012, and Shinzo Abe became prime minister, the situation has again changed significantly. In 2013, the National Security
Council was established, and simultaneously, the National Security Strategy was publicly announced. 9 Japan touted the basic principle of its National Security Strategy to be that "Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a "Proactive Contributor to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation."
This concept of being a "proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation" is not just the focus of the diplomatic security policy of the Abe administration. It is also intended to clarify Japan's role in the post-Cold War international community, a position for which Japan has been searching since the Gulf War.
Naturally, at the heart of being a "proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation" is active participation in UN PKOs. 
Providing arms to a South Korean Unit
With the outbreak of the coup d'état in December 2013, the Japanese SDF unit was not directly harmed, but there was fear that UNMISS units would be involved in the conflict.
Under those circumstances, a South Korean unit made a request to UN headquarters for additional ammunition to handle the conflict, and the UN passed the request for support to the Japanese government. Lending and borrowing ammunition among PKO units was not necessarily unusual, but Japan was faced with a difficult decision. Because of Japan's Three Principles on Arms Exports, the transfer of arms to other countries must be restrained.
The (1) arms exports to the target countries in the three principles would not be allowed, that (2) arms exports to other regions would be restrained in conformity with the spirit of the Constitution, and that (3) the export of equipment related to the production of arms would be treated as equivalent to the export of arms. Thus, anything classified as arms had the imposed restriction that Japan must restrain any exports, even to countries that are not communist bloc countries, countries subject to arms embargo, or countries involved in conflicts. These Three Principles on Arm Exports have been supported by the people of Japan, who will not allow their country with its peace-loving constitution become a "merchant of death." Furthermore, Japan has less experience than other countries in waging war, making it unlikely that high-priced Japanese weapons could be exported.
Because of this, even though the industrial world would likely approve of the export, the Three Principles on Arm Exports set Japan as an example of a peace-loving nation, and, this reasoning functioned as a solid quasi-constitutional understanding. Hence, providing ammunition to the South Korean unit's dilemma required a prudent response, as Japan also feared the flood of criticism were it to violate the Three Principles on Arm Exports. However, the Abe administration, stressing Japan's proactive contributions to peace, decided to transfer 10,000 rounds of ammunition, arguing that "given the urgent necessity and the highly humanitarian nature of the situation," 12 protecting the lives of the South Korean units and the 15,000 refugees they safeguarded superseded the importance of the Three Principles on Arm Exports.
Nevertheless, based on government statements from past Diets, the request to supply arms or ammunition from the United Nations was completely unexpected. In the past, even if they had received such a request, they would have refused. The opposition parties in Japan used this inconsistency between past government statements and the current administration's decision to question the decision itself. Furthermore, in South Korea, receiving a supply of ammunition from the Japanese SDF was roundly criticized for being linked to an exercise of the right to collective self-defense, a subject increasingly debated in Japan. 13 Because of this, South Korea supplied its units with the ammunition and returned the 10,000 rounds of ammunition received from Japan.
This incident also showed how the question of Japan's contributions to international causes had not changed much since the Gulf War. Japan desires to contribute to the building and maintenance of the international order and to earn a position of honor within the international community. Nonetheless, it has faced various constitutional and quasi-constitutional restrictions, while also feeling pressure from other countries, such as South Korea's concerns about Japan's rearming. Combined, this means that Japan must act with extremely limited options. Moreover, the official relationship between Japan and 
Peace and security legislation
Facing such fundamental questions, the state of Japan's participation in PKOs has been taken up as a major issue in the debate surrounding peace and security legislation, a key policy of the Abe administration. In February 2013, a mere two months after the administration took power, experts formed the "Council on Reconstruction of a Legal
Basis for Security" (commonly, the "security legislation council"), who then issued a report in May 2014. 14 The report looked at various issues, such as the emergence of China as a major military power and the problem of North Korea developing nuclear weapons and missiles, and it laid out the legal situation surrounding security in Japan.
The main focus of the report was the possibility of exercising of the right of collective self-defense and the extent to which this right could be exercised. However, a point made in the report relevant to this study is that participation in UN PKOs is not prohibited by Such relaxing of legal restrictions aimed to lower the hurdles associated with participating in UN PKOs, with the aim of realizing the ideal of proactively contributing to peace. Nevertheless, the bill faced strong resistance from opposition parties during deliberations. In a major shift, even the coalition party Komeito had a negative opinion of the bill. Furthermore, there was also harsh criticism about the bill from public opinion and the mass media. This was despite the fact that the most important change to the Five Principles of PKO participation, the provision on rush-and-rescue missions, was nothing but an additional point, and the original principles, such as the need for a ceasefire agreement, the consent principle, and the neutrality principle, continued to apply. From the perspective of proactively contributing to peace, the five principles governing PKO participation held as conditions for participating in traditional PKOs, but these conditions became too high of a hurdle for participating in modern PKOs. However, due to concerns about the safety of SDF soldiers dispatched as PKO personnel and their involvement in local conflicts, the ruling coalition agreed to not make any major changes to the five principles governing PKO participation when revising the PKO Cooperation Act.
Withdrawal from South Sudan
The Meanwhile, after this incident, a situation referred to as the "daily report affair" occurred. The "daily report affair" was multifaceted, but one aspect was that whenever the word "combat" was used in the daily reports written by the SDF soldiers to describe the daily situation of their deployment, the Ministry of Defense would replace the word with the phrase "armed conflict 15 " in their summaries of the reports. Another aspect was that it became clear that although the government was claiming that the daily reports had been destroyed, they were actually being kept in storage, which raised questions about whether the government was trying to hide the reality that the SDF had seen combat.
Furthermore, there were criticisms about the government's approach of preferring to suppress information over storing documents, and some questioned whether the Minister of Defense was directly involved in the so-called suppression of information.
The main issue in the daily report affair was that the Ministry of Defense, in violation of one of the five principles governing PKO participation, tried to avoid recalling the SDF units, even though a ceasefire agreement was no longer in place. When the country was plunged into a state of civil war in July 2016, and fighting broke out near the encampment, the act of replacing "combat" with "armed conflict" was a nuance illustrating that the ceasefire agreement was just barely being maintained. This was considered an intentional act to avoid withdrawing the SDF units. Additionally, while the true intent of the Minister of Defense initially stating to the Diet that "the daily reports were destroyed" is unclear, it is possible that the motivation was to not disclose that the word "combat" was being used.
During the disputes in the Diet surrounding the daily report affair, the Abe cabinet Sudan and the pursuit of the daily report affair in the Diet influenced the decision to withdraw, resulting in a major impact on Japan's future participation in UN PKOs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we reconstructed Japan's PKO actions since the time of the Gulf War, looking back from that time until the present withdrawal from South Sudan. Based on these observations, we can make several conclusions.
First, Japan faces strong legal restrictions, and powerful norms have been erected due to these restrictions. The Gulf War trauma that resulted from solely financial support not being regarded as contribution to international causes opened the possibility of human resource contributions instead. Additionally, the PKO Cooperation Act opened the option of participating in UN PKOs. This occurred despite the significant resistance these changes encountered. However, against the backdrop of constitutional restrictions and criticisms from the public and the mass media, the government developed a compromise with Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party, leading to the only restrictions for PKO participation being the five principles governing PKO participation. Because of the existence of these restrictions, in South Sudan, where the ceasefire agreement was unstable and civil war broke out, the dilemma between reality and legal restrictions triggered the daily report affair. The withdrawal from South Sudan, which was influenced by the daily report affair, means that there will be even higher hurdles for participation in future PKOs. There will likely be a stronger tendency to participate in low-risk PKOs that have ceasefire agreements in place, rather than to promote proactive contributions to peace by revising the five principles regarding PKO participation.
Second, due to the accumulated successes of missions in Cambodia and East Timor, there is a deeper understanding of PKOs in Japan, and the strong resistance encountered when the PKO Cooperation Act was enacted no longer exists. In fact, the Japanese public has praised Japan's proactive contributions to international causes, giving the mission problems that cannot be resolved with PKOs, such as those involving anti-terror policies and North Korean nuclear developments. This is another factor as to why UN interventions have found it difficult to achieve their goals.
In this modern security environment, it has come time for Japan to once again discuss how it will continue contributing to PKOs, whether its participation is possible in light of the dynamically changing roles and missions of PKOs, and what Japan hopes to achieve by contributing to PKOs. How will Japan realize the fundamental principle of its National Security Strategy of proactively contributing to peace based on the principle of international cooperation? To what extent must Japan take risks for this purpose? Such discussions are important because recent experiences in situations such as the South Sudan PKO remain current. Without these discussions, Japan may be unable to contribute to anything but traditional PKOs, making it difficult to realize its proactive contributions to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.
